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Mortal Friends, Best Enemies

Chapter 5 Balances and Military Forces

In summary: CW examines looks at the effect of institutions on Russian-German relations on three issues: the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, the legacy of nuclear weapons post-USSR and the issue of new roles for the German military (in the so-called Eurocorps and in relaxing the constitutional constraint on German forces being used outside NATO area.)

CFE:

1990 Agreement on NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, putting both overall limits and sub-limits on forces, involving a large reduction on equipment levels, with extensive verification procedures.

After break up of USSR, two issues arise: how to reallocate USSR limits among CIS states. North Atlantic Co-operation Council work with CIS states esp Ukraine helps bring about awareness of more limited requirements for purely defensive operations. Second, whether to allow Russia to reallocate forces to “flanks” esp South because of increased security needs. Eventual agreement (after R threaten not to implement CFE) to allow more flexibility to R on sub-limits.

Ex-Soviet Nuclear Weapons:

Tactical: Belarus, Ukraine still had tactical nukes after USSR break-up. Ukraine tried to prevent transfer to R in spring 1992, but following Western criticism releases them.

Strategic: West expected all post-USSR states to become non-nuclear states under the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) except Russia. Ukraine agreed transfer, but 1992 refuses transfer. Ukraine and R in disputes over Black Sea Fleet, Crimea, Gas. Following intervention by USA, agreement for R to provide non-military nuclear assistance to Ukraine, USA and R to guarantee Ukraine security and Ukr. To transfer strategic nukes to R. US provided economic assistance to Ukr.

German military forces:

Two changes to G military forces post CW:

“Eurocorps” set up with French and German troops, other EC countries to lesser extent.

Also interpretation of G restrictions on use of military to allow forces to be involved in multilateral ventures (rather than just NATO defense versus R). This as a result of G non-involvement in both Gulf War and early Yugo crisis.

Independent role for institutions:

CFE: CW argues yes, especially CFE where accepted by many that CFE could not have been agreed post 1992, and therefore G and R wished to hold on to existing agreement. Worked even when concerns shifted from arms control (PD) issues to more general transparency/ avoidance of instability.

Nukes: Institutions not very important. NPT regime had a role, but not designed to deal with intense security concerns.

New role for German forces: Russians reassured by the multilateral framework of both innovations.