

Kenneth A. Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," *International Organization*, 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 233-266.

-Schultz wants to clarify the 'democratic peace' debate by looking at clear causal mechanisms; wants to devise tests that discriminate between causal variables

-two sets of arguments have emerged

-first, the 'institutional constraints' approach: institutions promote accountability; higher political risks with war

-second, a strain of thought that focuses on information—democratic institutions reveal info. about preferences

[Fearon]

-Schultz focuses on how states respond to military threats posed by democracies

-the institutional argument indicates that a state threatened by a democracy should not be worried b/c democracies are institutionally constrained from posing a military threat; escalation by the threatened state is likely

-the informational argument indicates that democratic governments reveal their preferences; thus, the threatened state is more likely to back down

-Schultz tests this for militarized disputes from 1816 to 1980; the results indicate that "the likelihood of reciprocation is lower when the initiating state is a democracy than when it is not, a result that is consistent with the predictions of the informational perspective. Moreover, this effect is substantively significant: A regime shift in the initiating state from nondemocracy to democracy has an equivalent effect on the probability of reciprocation as a shift in power status from a minor to a major power. ... [T]hese results ... should lead us to increase our confidence in the informational perspective and decrease our confidence in the institutional constraints perspective." [234]

-formal model; regressions using COW data are used by Schultz to advance his argument