Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," in *Cooperation under Anarchy*, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 1-24.

-Oye wants to explain why under anarchy (no international authority) states can still cooperate and achieve common goals; "If international relations can approximate both a Hobbesian state of nature and a Lockean civil society, why does cooperation emerge in some cases and not in others?" [1]
-cooperation: defined as "conscious policy coordination" [6]

-Oye uses elementary game theory and microeconomics analogies (throughout the entire edited book)

-first section: Payoff Structure
    -payoff structure is an "intervening variable" between "cognitive, domestic, and international structural factors and international cooperation" [5-6]
    -for a *mutual benefit* to exist, actors must prefer mutual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection (DD)
        -if DD is preferred to CC, cooperation is not possible [Deadlock]
    -for coordination to be necessary, actors must prefer unilateral defection (DC) to lonely cooperation (CD)
        -if actors prefer CD to DC, there is no incentive to cheat and no need for conscious coordination
    -Oye explains the logic of several games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Chicken
        -makes the point that in single-play conditions, all that matters is the ordinal preferences (the magnitude of differences in payoff should not matter)
        -BUT changes in payoff outcomes can transform the game
        -also, under iterated conditions the magnitude of differences among payoffs within a given class of games can be important in determining cooperation

    -payoff structures can be changed by a whole host of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral strategies
        -bilateral changes: most significant strategy is issue linkage
        -multilateral changes: payoffs can be changed two ways
            -first, norms generated by regimes may be "internalized" by states
            -second, information may alter payoffs

-second section: Single-Play and Iterated Games
    -this distinction is fundamental to understanding cooperation
    -under single-play conditions in the Prisoner's Dilemma or Stag Hunt, cooperation would be irrational
    -but in iterated conditions, cooperation becomes more likely; tit-for-tat strategies
    -reciprocity determines future payoffs/costs of cooperation and defection
    -ways to make situations more iterative
        -first, break up issues; decompose them into a set of smaller cooperative opportunities than one big step
        -second, strategies of issue linkage may work

-third section: Number of Players (Two-Person and N-Person Games)
    -the prospects of cooperation diminish as the number of players increases
        -first, the more the players, the greater the difficulty in identifying common interests
        -second, recognition and control problems increase
        -third, feasability of sanctioning defectors diminishes