

James D. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security," *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 2. (Spring, 1993), pp. 207-233.

Morrow takes issue with the Christensen-Snyder hypothesis that chain-ganging occurs in periods of perceived offensive advantage while buck-passing occurs when defence is thought dominant. Europe in the 1860's, he argues, provides a counterexample: in spite of perceived offensive advantage, the wars of German unification did not expand into general conflicts. Instead, allies passed the buck, abandoned their alliance partners, and the wars thus remained local, even though the resultant formation of Germany destabilised the overall power balance.

As an alternate explanation, Morrow considers "balancing" more broadly, in which alliances are only a part. Alliances will form when nations need to increase their power quickly and cheaply, even if this new power has some costs in terms of unreliability and potential involvement in unprofitable conflicts. However, nations can also perform "internal balancing" by developing and improving their armaments and army. Morrow reviews the costs and benefits associated with each of these means to increase power, but emphasises that élites need not consciously make such cost-benefit calculation: in times of peril they need merely attempt to implement a means, and if the domestic and international costs are too great, a different method can be attempted. This will tend to force countries towards the most efficient response to a threat.