Milner

two-level game, first a complete information game, using one-dimentional utility funtion, between foreign and domestic executive leaders. then add domestic congress for ratification of the result, first information is complete and then domestic congress is not sure about the types of foreign states. here Milner makes several mistakes. it seems that she is not clear about the asymetric game structure. she intuitively points out that principal, the congress, is not sure about foreign preference, so it is not sure where the outcome lies, but she does not point out clearly that this is a game in which foreign state has several types(or continuous types) which is known to domestic excecutive but unknown to congress. It seems that she does not understand this at all. she even says that congress has two types: optimistic and pessimistic. this makes a mess and leads to wrong conclusions. preferred-to set is useless. just assume that foreign state has two types, one is depicted and the other is to its right, that is between f and p. then it's quite intuitive to see that the outcome to the right of c should be the same as the situation where congress has complete information about foreign state.