

Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy

- question: how strongly do norms of sovereignty constrain power-based behavior?

Chapters 1, 8

1. types of sovereignty, as defined by territory, autonomy, recognition, and control
 - a. international legal sovereignty: practices associated with mutual recognition of territorial entities and the status of a political entity in the international system
 - no specific rules on when to recognize a government; stronger states use recognition as a political instrument of leverage
 - most rulers want recognition, because it provides them with both material and normative resources- secure status in int'l courts, immunity of diplomats, legitimacy in constituents' eyes
 - b. Westphalian sovereignty: exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory
 - violation can be voluntary or through invitations or involuntary intervention
 - c. domestic sovereignty: organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within territory
 - d. interdependence sovereignty: ability of authorities to regulate flows of goods, information, or capital across their borders
2. logics determining actions
 - a. logic of consequences: rational calculation of costs and benefits; deals with the *ability* of states to exercise control in varying areas
 - b. logic of appropriateness: rules, roles, and identities that define appropriate behavior in given situations; deals with whether the state has the *authority* or right to engage in specific kinds of activities; Westphalian sovereignty and int'l legal sovereignty exclusively refer to these issues
3. types of deviation from institutional norms / rules which undermine sovereignty norm
 - a. conventions- Pareto improving and not contingent on actions of others, i.e. state agrees to abide by certain standards regardless of what others do
 - very rarely deals with security or economics, since you want to make sure that other parties honor their commitments too
 - happens when rulers want to strengthen values and practices of successors
 - b. contracts- Pareto improving but contingent on others, i.e. agree to specific policies in return for explicit benefits
 - consistent with international legal sovereignty, but might not be with Westphalian sovereignty
 - c. coercion- not Pareto improving but contingent on others, i.e. leaves them worse off though they do have some bargaining leverage; example- sanctions
 - d. imposition- not Pareto improving and not contingent on others, i.e. target so much less powerful that they have to submit to external demands; involves force
4. why are sovereignty norms violated?
 - ontology: elite policy makers- rulers want to stay in power, and as such, they promote the security, prosperity, and values of their constituents
 - rulers have a commitment to the needs and wants of their domestic constituents; as such, they will abide by international commitments, e.g. nonintervention, when it suits their needs, but break them by emphasizing alternative norms, e.g. human rights, when internal pressures to remedy external actions arise- principles and practices eventually become decoupled, as the logic of consequences trumps the logic of appropriateness
 - constructivist approach that norms become embedded is naïve, since responsibility to domestic constituents, the absence of any international authority structures, the asymmetries of power among states, and the diversity of norms espoused by rules and their constituents make it impossible for institutional arrangements at the international level to become embedded, p220
 - Westphalian and international legal sovereignty are examples of organized hypocrisy- they have typically been violated when conventional norms or rules fail to provide them with resources and support (both material and ideational)