


Khong's *Analogies at War*, Chapter Seven



AE Framework:

1. Definition of situation: Aggression
2. Stakes: Vital
3. Implicit prescription: Intervene
4. Morally acceptable to intervene: Yes
5. Likelihood of success: Good
6. Dangers: Unspecified

(copied from Khong's Figure 7.1, "The Lessons of Munich and the Option Chosen")

Chapter Seven represents Khong's analysis of how the Munich Analogy was utilized to justify U.S. policy decisions with regard to Vietnam and Korea. The Lessons of Munich and the 1930's advanced Johnson's proposition that Diem had to avoid being a "Chamberlain" and instead be a "Churchill" in standing up to would-be aggressors.

1. Johnson, from an AE perspective, depicted Churchill as standing alone against the ascendancy of fascism, while
2. Rusk related the international crisis to his days at Oxford when "on the night in 1933 of the debate on the motion, 'that this house will not fight for king and country'.... That motion passed. The motion was quoted by Hitler as an indication that Britain wouldn't fight and therefore his hands were free to pursue his ambitions."

Munich helped support the domino effect of communism, mainly that:

1. Failure to stop the Asian Dominoes from falling—with South Vietnam as the Czechoslovakia of the 1960's—would require the United States to fight communism later and under worse conditions
2. It would probably cause World War III.
3. South Vietnam would be the first victim of expansionist communism, just as the Sudetenland had first succumbed to fascism's advance.
4. The moral was simple: it was shameful and unwise for Chamberlain to appease Hitler; and the same moral applied to appeasing Ho Chi Minh and Mao Zedong.

The question becomes, "Why did Johnson not pursue Option E' above, if the image of protecting the Great Society did not fully come into play?"

Khong contends that the need to avoid provoking China, and its presumed ally the Soviet Union, into entering the Vietnam War was uppermost in the minds of Johnson and his advisers. The need to avoid another analogy, that of MacArthur's mistake in Korea, is a sentiment that Khong extracts from the documents of 1964 and 1965.