Peter Katzenstein, "Coping With Terrorism: Norms and Internal Security in Germany and Japan," in Goldstein and Keohane eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy*

I. OVERVIEW

Katzenstein seeks to demonstrate that the degree to which the norms unique to Germany and Japan have effected each of their responses to terrorist threats. Katzenstein uses a "method of difference" approach to examine how differing norms in the two modern, Western(ized), wealthy countries produced different responses when both were faced with similar terrorist threats dating from the 70's. Katzenstein argues that German norms of being a good international citizen and seeking to enhance their "moral leadership" within the EC/EU (and other international bodies) led them to pursue very proactive cooperative agreements with other nations in order to combat global terrorism. Katzenstein further argues that Germany has waged a particularly techno-friendly war against terrorism. German police response has been rather devoid of human contact between police and suspects and sources of information, relying rather on massive and sophisticated computer based profiling and data-basing techniques. On the other end of the spectrum, Katzenstein maintains that Japanese norms of belief in their cultural uniqueness have led the island-nation to self-imposed isolation in the face of global terrorist threats. Rather then seeking to become nested in international anti-terrorist organizations, Japan has simply sought to export their terrorist problems—they have been little concerned with the doings of terrorists beyond their boarders. Further, norms of civic-police interaction have led to extensive contacts of "beat-cops" with the Japanese citizenry. The norm of citizen-authority cooperation has underlain a mostly successful effort to separate the terrorist "fish" from the human "sea" in which they hide through methods based on personal contact.

II. TERRORISM AND GOVT. RESPONSE (p. 269-72)

Katzenstein makes the case that both Germany and Japan face similar threats so that their differing responses to the dangers of terrorism cannot be explained by differing levels of terrorist activity etc. He notes that both countries have >20,000 active terrorists and sympathizers and, although the absolute rate of terrorism in Japan is lower than in Germany, given the lower overall crime rate there, both face similar degrees of terrorist threats relative to overall criminal activity. While the Germans have sought to meet this threat by detailing a significant number of police to deal with it relative to Japan, Japan's flexible system of police assignment allows them to martial a great number of forces to deal with the threat on a more ad hoc basis.

III. DOMESTIC NORMS AND INTERNAL SECURITY

A. GERMANY (p. 275-7)

Internally, Germany has relied on "preventive" and "intelligent" anti-terrorism operations based on a high tech computer based indexing and profiling system. The system is based on determining and tracking potential terrorists based on a terrorist profile created within the German police terrorism unit. According to Katzenstein, "the norms characterizing Germany's domestic policy of internal security are centered on the idea of the lawful state." Katzenstein goes to great lengths to note (1) the degree to which Germany has relied on an increasingly large and comprehensive law code to deal with every conceivable internal threat, and (2) the tremendously invasive nature of German anti-terrorist laws—including giving the police begin legal proceedings against suspects even without specific evidence (conviction rates have been low under this law).

B. JAPAN (p. 279-80)

Domestically, Katzenstein notes that "in contrast to the high-tech image that Japanese industry has projected during the last two decades, the Japanese police have relied primarily on their traditionally close relations with the public in their efforts to defend Japan's internal security." Japan, contrary to Germany, has dealt with the terrorist threat with a strategy of informalism dictated both by the deadlocked Japanese legislature and Japanese norms of civilian collaboration with authorities. Despite the "liberal" interpretation of their legal rights in conducting investigations by the Japanese police, the incidence of civilian disapproval of such trespasses has been low. Further, the Japanese have been able to inculcate in their populace the ideas that terrorism is bad and ought not to be supported. This, combined with the personal contacts cultivated by the police have proved very successful at driving terrorism largely out of Japan.

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IV. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND INTERNAL SECURITY

A. GERMANY (p. 280-1)

Because of German norms of good world-citizenship and "abstract universalism," Germany has sought to net itself within—and lead— multi-lateral regimes concerning terrorism. According to Katzenstein, the most significant international aspect of the German counter-terrorism effort is TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence, International), a multilateral, multi-national anti-terrorist working group. Tied to the EU but beyond its oversight, TREVI has facilitated Europe and worldwide counter-terrorist activities facilitating information sharing, and coordination between the various police units involved.

B. JAPAN (p.284-5)

Rather than being at the forefront to international efforts, Katzenstein argues that "Japan lacks in international society what it has in domestic society, an ideology of law and moral vision of a good society." Japan, Katzenstein avers, lacks a sense of Germany's good neighborliness because of a belief in its distinctiveness as a civilization—one unattached to its neighbors. Further, notes Katzenstein, there is no similar organization to TREVI in Asia. Except in the case of a relatively few bilateral extradition treaties, Japan relies on ad hoc reciprocity to conduct international anti-terrorist operations.

V. NORMS ARE CONTESTED AND CONTINGENT (p. 286-9)

Katzenstein modifies his assumption that norms are the primary causal factor driving policy making by noting that norms are both contingent and contested. They are *contested* in that there are several norms available to an actor in any given situation—choosing between them or merging them can be an unpredictable process. However Katzenstein argues that "the comparison between Japan and Germany demonstrates that different focal points [based on endogenous norms] for political conflict will yield different outcomes. Different political systems exhibit different forms of rationality." Further, norms are *contingent* on various structural imperatives e.g. organizational structures, relations between state and society, etc. Still norms predispose policies in different stated to be made in certain ways—Katzenstein argues that his case studies have shown this to be the case.

VI. DRUGS (p. 289-91)

Katzenstein closes by noting that, if norms are causal and pervasive, their effects should be apparent across issue areas. He briefly outlines how German response to drug problems mirrors its terrorist activities—Germany's norms for legalism and good international citizenship have structured its response here as well. It has again sought to take the lead in international efforts (including working under the auspices of TREVI) to counter drugs and its counter drug laws are among the most "progressive" in the world (in fact being what would, in most countries, boarder on illegal search and seizure). On the other hand, Japan, has again sought to institute informal, social solutions to its drug problems seeking to stigmatize and isolate both users and dealers. Again, the close relationship between the populace and the police have made this an effective strategy. In international counter drug efforts, despite its professed willingness to take part in multi-lateral counter drug activities, "Japan has remained relatively by American standards."