Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer & Volker Rittberger. *Theories of International Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chapters 1, 2.

Chapter 1

Hasenclever, et. al., observe that interest in the role of institutions and regimes persists, and important questions about them are still being asked (e.g., "what accounts for the emergence of instances of rule-based cooperation in the international system", "how do international institutions … affect the behavior of state and non-state actors in the issue-areas for which they have been created", etc.). Depending on where the emphasis is placed (power, interests, knowledge), they classify theories about regimes as: Realist, Neoliberal, or Cognitivist. These range from a relatively weak view of institutions (Realists), to a somewhat stronger one (Neoliberals), to the strongest (Cognitivists). Hasenclever, et. al., propose two measures for institutions:

    i)   effectiveness: a regime is effective to the extent that its members abide by its norms and rules, and to the extent that it achieves certain objectives or fulfills certain purposes, and

    ii)   robustness: a regime's "staying power" in the face of challenges (e.g. to the extent that prior institutional choices constrain collective decisions and behavior in later periods).

The different degrees of institutionalism of each of the three theories listed above is due to the behavioral models employed by each, i.e. the assumptions that they make about the nature of the actors. Thus, power-based theories (Realist) argue that relative gains matter also, whereas Neoliberals tend to emphasize the interest that states have in their own, absolute gains. "Weak Cognitivists" wish to supplement Neoliberalism with a theory of preference formation, where "Strong Cognitivists" accuse Neoliberals of failing to account for the ways in which institutions affect the identities of international actors.

Chapter 2

Hasenclever, et. al., begin with Strange's criticism of theories of international regimes, according to which the very concept is imprecise. To this they juxtapose Krasner's attempt at a useful and usable definition, according to which regimes are "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice". Despite its flaws, this definition has promoted research by providing students of regimes with a valuable analytical tool, or at least, a non-arbitrary point of departure. However, there are two problems with it: i) how can one distinguish between principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, and ii) when can we say that a rule exists in a certain issue area? The chapter proceeds to examine Young's three objections to Krasner's definition (definition is only a list of elements that are hard to differentiate, it exhibits "disconcerting elasticity" when applied to real world of international relations, and it fails to link the concept of a regime to the larger issues that concern international regimes). Hasenclever, et.

al., then consider Keohane's proposed remedy for this, which comes in the form of the following definition: "Regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations". The chapter then turns to the consideration of behavioral (determined through an observation of actors' actions), cognitive (emphasis on intersubjective meanings and shared understandings), and formal theories of regimes (assessing regimes in terms of explicit rules). Hasenclever, et. al., examine some of the disadvantages of these theories (tautology of defining regimes "on the basis of observed behaviour, and then … [using] them to 'explain' observed behaviour", collecting relevant information, etc.), but note that despite these shortcomings, these approaches are employed by the three schools of thought listed above, with Realists and Neoliberals preferring formal and behavioral tools, and Cognitivists preferring … cognitive ones. The chapter ends with the declaration of the authors' intention to examine all three approaches to the formation of regime theories, in order to determine the extent to which they succeed in providing strong theories that survive Strange's criticism.