

Gourevitch

1) Realists view institutions as having no coercive power while institutionalists views their power lying in its utility, not physical power. It seems that the real issue is when and which model fits reality better.

2) why institutions are formed?

Utilitarian view: it is deliberate solution to chaos(classical philosophers), collection choice problem, facilitating cooperation by supplying info, reducing transaction cost and monitoring free ride. Example: law merchant. Whether joining or exiting institutions depend on benefit/cost analysis.

Constructivism: Burke's organical theory, and morden constructivism focuses on ideas, history and discourse.

3) why do governance dispute occur?

Realists tend to focus on weak institutional constrain, little investment in given institution and less linkage and narrow focus of these investments. Institutionalists tend to view the opposite. The author is favoring the latter.

4) what kinds of institution are sought?

Since there is choice of whether to select suboptimal institution and which point in pareto frontier to choose, there is much scope of choice. Institution will have great influence on policy outcome, Poland's tragedy and Britain's strong position is contrasted.

5) how are governance disputes resolved? We have to look at 3 sets of variables. Weak or strong institutional context(this is of cardinal importance and we should look at this first), collective-action issue and information cost. 1. Case of strong institution, US congress refuse to grant institutional change of free-tract authority of president. 2. Case of weak institution, OPEC, League of Nations, strategic interaction and bargaining may be more important here. (it's possible to go from weak to strong, EEC-EU and GATT- WTO are examples. I think these examples are not very relevant here.) 3. Collective action and information cost determines under given institutions which new institutions are to be chosen. Joint production is a solution to collective problem and it will influence which institution to choose given who contributes more. As to information, a kind of Bayesian game and prior ideas serve common knowledge to update and select institutions.

Examples are constitution writing(US/France) and post-great-war regime selection(Viena/Verdaille/after WWII)

6) Impact of institutions on preferences and strategies: feedback

Building bigger civilization involves change of preferences and identities. Like in case of EU. Convergent point of rationalists and constructivists, it's hard to distinguish long and short run phenomena. Civil wars also offer similar examples, though in a different direction. Yugoslavia civil war. Tipping game as information revealing causes different strategy. Credible commitment to a new institution is essential for new stability.