Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 170-182.

-the methodology employed by George and Smoke in *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (1974)

    -a "structured, focused comparison" that uses a relatively small number of historical case studies to develop a more differentiated theory than one offered by deductive theory

    -individual cases "are used as building blocks to create a cumulative development of typological explanatory theory"

-Achen and Snidal preference for deductive theory is wrong

    -it "Black Boxes" the decision-making and strategic-interaction process

    -it cannot use empirical research to modify the theory

    -cannot look at different levels of deterrence

    -it requires empirical research: theory of rationality that employs auxiliary assumptions (if "pure rationality" is not successful) develops those assumptions from an understanding of what actually happens in historical cases

    -the main problem is that, lacking operationalization, rational deterrence theory "is difficult, if not impossible, to refute; as a result, it is being endowed with a validity that is highly questionable, insufficiently qualified, and certainly premature." [must operationalize credibility and potent threat]

    -deductive deterrence theory also has very little use for the policymaker; must use the historical cases and context-specific intelligence that George & Smoke prefer