

Gov. 2710, Wk. 9 Notes, Peter B. Evans, "Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: Reflections and Projections" – conclusion to Peter Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert Putnam, eds. *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Politics and Domestic Politics*.

Evans summarizes the findings of the case studies regarding approaches to how to combine domestic and international explanations in understanding conflicts and accords among nations. He understands international negotiations "as a double-edged process in which every actor tries to take into account expected reactions on both the domestic and international levels," and places great importance on the role of the COG (chief of government). Note that his chapter is a summary of intriguing points rather than a presentation and testing or plausibility probe of hypotheses.

I. The first group of 'results and reflections' deals with variations in the relative autonomy of the COG.

1. The strategy of 'tying hands' or deliberately shrinking the win-set to gain leverage: this is infrequently attempted (leaders generally prefer 'slack' to tied hands) and usually not effective. This strategy is more likely to work in 'negotiations among friends,' in which negotiations are over means rather than conflicting interests.
2. Although COGs have considerable agenda-setting power, their relative autonomy decreases continuously and substantially over the course of most negotiations because: (i) they become more constrained by mobilized interest groups, and (ii) COGs themselves become politically invested in/publicly identified with the on-going negotiations – this may enlarge the COG's personal win-set to any agreement at all.
3. Leaders who are more hawkish (antagonistic to the other side in negotiations) relative to their constituents have less autonomy than those who are dove-ish, as the former have difficulty making credible threats. Doves have the opportunity of 'COG collusion,' in which leaders may form a transnational alliance to increase their autonomy relative to their domestic constituencies (ie. by agreeing to link issues).
4. Manipulation of foreign perceptions of ratifiability is not an effective strategy (even for authoritarian regimes), because, 'the informational consequences of national boundaries' are relatively low – there is uncertainty on the part of all leaders about what would go through all sides' domestic institutions; COGs are surprisingly likely to misjudge what is ratifiable in their own polities.

II. The second group deals with various configurations of domestic and international interests.

1. When the costs are concentrated (making those subject to them easier to organize) and benefits diffuse, agreements are more difficult to achieve.
2. Interests that create obstacles to international agreements in the short run are likely to be the object of restructuring efforts in the long run. COGs may try to use the results of international bargains to change domestic interest structures, strengthening the political/economic position of supportive groups and weakening that of opponents.

3. The book's cases suggest that there is no relationship between the extent of enfranchisement (ie. democracy, authoritarianism) and the propensity to conclude agreements. This is in contradiction with the literature's idea that polities with broad enfranchisement will have smaller win-sets and a harder time ratifying agreements.
4. There is little relationship between the presence of transnational actors in a particular arena and the likelihood that an attempted agreement will succeed. Evans suggests that these actors primary function is to provide information and lessen informational asymmetries (see I, 4), so their influence may be folded into this factor. However, both successful and failed agreements are associated with the subsequent formation of new transnational alliances, and this may affect further negotiations.

-The study suggests that these forms of synergistic bargaining, in which both domestic and international elements play a part, are becoming more common over time. Do they have welfare-enhancing effects? Not necessarily: they tend to accompany the increasing marginalization of domestically-oriented economic interests, and while this may increase the probability of successful agreements, it may also have regressive distributional effects within a polity.