

Peter B. Evans, "Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics," in Evans, Harold Jacobson, and Robert Putnam (eds.) *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Politics and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 397-430.

- I. This book is designed to look at how Putnam's two-level games work in practice across a range of different case studies. Case studies were selected so as to cover many different types of international bargaining situations -- security vs. economic interests, coercive vs. cooperative bargaining, and interactions between countries from the same and different regions. Some of the most interesting insights derived from the various case studies can be divided into three sections concerning:
  - A. The autonomy of the chief of government (COG) in conducting negotiations
  - B. The dependence of agreement on configurations of domestic and international interests
  - C. Change over time in the amount of opportunity for synergistic strategies
  
- II. Autonomy of the chief of government
  - A. COG's rarely employ the strategy of pleading that their hands are tied to force the other side to make the bulk of concessions. When this strategy is used, it does not appear to be very effective.
  - B. COGs have the most autonomy at the outset of a negotiation, particularly when the agenda is being set (i.e. they can determine what problems will become the focus of negotiation). Their autonomy decreases as the negotiation proceeds since domestic players become mobilized as specific possibilities become clear and since COGs can become trapped by personal investment in the negotiations.
  - C. COGs who are dovish (i.e. are more sympathetic than their constituents to the other side's position) end up with more autonomy than those who are hawkish. Doves are able to collude with the other side's COG (COG collusion) to promote agreement (through issue linkage for example, or by using transnational actors to expand the win set at home). Hawks have a harder time, particularly since the credibility of their threats may be verified, and thus challenged, by the other side.
  - D. International borders do not seem to have a big effect on information flows. COGs were not as good as expected at determining the ratifiability of an agreement within their own country, but were better than expected at assessing prospects for ratification in the other country. (In one case, British skeptics had a more realistic appraisal of the French win set on arms collaboration than the French themselves did.) There were very few cases of COGs attempting to misrepresent their domestic win set to their advantage, and in the few cases in which it was tried, only once was it successful.
  
- III. Configurations of interests and prospects for agreement
  - A. Agreement is very difficult when its benefits would be diffuse but its costs concentrated. The certainty of failure depends on the extent to which those who would bear the costs are disproportionately enfranchised.
  - B. When domestic interests block an agreement, COGs are likely to respond by attempting to weaken those interests subsequently. This is often difficult to accomplish, even in the long run, though COGs can increase their leverage in this regard through two-level strategies.
  - C. There was no apparent relationship between the degree of domestic enfranchisement and the ability to reach agreements. In contrast to what is often asserted, the democracies in these case studies were not handicapped with relatively small win sets due

- to their pluralism. Instead, authoritarian states in a number of cases had surprisingly small win sets as autocratic leaders had difficulty satisfying the inflexible demands of their smaller set of constituents.
- D. The presence of transnational actors in a given area does not make it more likely that agreement will be reached in that area. While their presence does increase opportunities for synergistic strategies, it also raises the possibility of increased resistance to agreement if it is perceived as threatening by the transnational players. (Note the role of IBM in the Brazil case study by Odell.)

#### IV. Historical change and opportunities for two-level strategies

- A. Over the past 50 years, and particularly since the 1980s, the increasing prevalence of transnational alliances and of economic (as opposed to security) concerns have conspired to make synergistic negotiating strategies more relevant. The integrative approach to international politics is thus increasingly relevant.
- B. Two things to keep in mind, however: 1) transnational actors can act to block agreements when they are perceived as threatening (so the point above should not be overstated), and 2) while the games being played may not be zero-sum, they can still involve losers -- agreements that marginalize domestic interests (such as labor) may have regressive distributional effects.