

Michael W. Doyle, "Politics and Grand Strategy," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds.), *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*.

Doyle argues that neorealist assumptions – and structuralism generally – leave some IR questions completely unconsidered, and that the extreme dominance of such theories is intellectually unhealthy. Therefore he considers case studies wherein one or more of the three neorealist assumptions (rationality, unity, and power-seeking nature of states) are relaxed.

Considering Ferdinand (II) of Aragon, Doyle concludes that the state took too many risks to conform to the neorealist paradigm of the security-motivated state; conversely, the Khedive Tewfik of Egypt rolled over and submitted too easily to British colonisation. These are taken to indicate that domestic impulses and constraints matter.

The Kantian "Perpetual Peace" argument, relying on a variety of constitutional, international, and cosmopolitan factors, shows that rational leaders might reject balancing and thereby depart from neorealist theories.

Doyle, unlike some realists, views the willingness of some European Socialist parties to go to war in August 1914 – and thereby ostensibly betray the international working class – as not security-motivated nationalism, but a rational, thoroughly Marxist analysis of a variety of domestic and international factors. Marxism cannot be rejected solely on the basis of this intraparty conflict.

Although relaxing realism reduces parsimony, the benefits (providing a richer context for the balance of power, accounting for variation in behaviour) exceed the costs. Strategy can thus be improved by studying the values, means, and conceptions of actors.