

Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 205-235; as well as Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2," *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 12, no. 4 (Fall 1983): 323-353.

-the main topic: explaining the foreign policy behaviour of liberal states

-liberalism does appear to disrupt balance-of-power politics (must do more than use systemic power factors to explain the foreign policy behaviour of liberal states)

-BUT, liberalism is not inherently 'peace-loving'; it can go to war

-nevertheless, Doyle is writing from a clear standpoint as a liberal: "Yet the peaceful intent and restraint that liberalism does manifest in limited aspects of its foreign affairs announces the possibility of a world peace this side of the grave or of world conquest. It has strengthened the prospects for a world peace established by the steady expansion of a separate peace among liberal societies." [206]

Defining Liberalism (Doyle): [206-207]

-ultimate concern of liberalism: the individual

-threefold set of rights undergird liberalism

-first, 'negative freedom': things the government cannot do [see essay by Berlin on the concept of liberty; the distinction there is much better]

-second, 'positive freedom': things the government should do, mainly in order to enable individuals to enjoy their fundamental rights (speech, religion, assembly, etc.)

-third, democratic participation/representation [this is needed to ensure the first two] [note: not necessarily true; in fact, this may ensure the death of the first two; similarly, the first two can exist w/o democracy]

-liberal regimes: how many are there?

-doyle stresses the amazing growth of liberal regimes: in the 18th century, 3 (Swiss cantons, the French Republic (1790-1795), and the U.S. (1776 on)); from 1800-1850, 8; 1850-1900, 13; 1900-1945, 29; and 1945-on, 49. [209-212]

Liberalism and Foreign Affairs

-the fundamental postulate of liberal foreign affairs thought: non-intervention principle (J.S. Mill)

-citizens in a regime that democratically represent them should be allowed to live in their state w/o interference from abroad [213]

-this has led to the startling situation: "*Even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another*" (emphasis original, pg. 213); this is a "liberal zone of peace" [213]

-another proposition: liberal states end up fighting on the same side 'despite the real complexity of the historical, economic and political factors that affect their foreign policies,' [217] [doyle cites some evidence: Italy in 1914-1915, a liberal member of the Triple Alliance with 'illiberal' Germany and Austria-Hungary, defected and joined the alliance with France and Britain; U.S. in WWI fought on the side of the liberals (France and Great Britain) despite simmering Anglo-American trade disputes; in my opinion, these examples are rather ad hoc and certainly miss a lot of the genuine reasons the U.S. and Italy fought on the sides they did]

-realism cannot explain these aberrations [218]

-the best explanation for the liberal peace comes from Kant ["Perpetual Peace"]

-there are a variety of factors that account for the "separate peace" among liberal states; none of these factors is sufficient, all are necessary...

-note: the decline of liberal states, esp. a hegemon like the U.S., is a threat to peace for the liberal world b/c the strong liberal states must support liberal causes elsewhere (or at least make sure that liberal states do not fall) [233]

-second article: the very constitutional features that make liberal states fundamentally different from all other states disrupt the "prudent-strategic calculation" that realists hope would inform the foreign policy behaviour of liberal states toward nonliberals Doyle argues that "liberalism has been equally striking as a failure in guiding foreign policy outside the liberal world." [323]