Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), Chapters 2-4.

Chapter 2: "Waltz, His Critics, and the Prospects for a Structural Realism"

Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, while acknowledging that other factors influenced state behaviour, attempted a purely system-level exegesis of international phenomena. In so doing, he built a coherent foundation for power-based theories that escaped the contentious "human nature" basis for classic Realism. But his definition of "structure" was so spare – and relegated so much to the unit level – that it immediately prompted reproach for being too narrow and allowing insufficient scope for change.

Such criticisms neglect the intent of Waltz's analysis, which was to show the continuity in world politics (e.g., of anarchy). They are not, however, wholly invalid, as structural realism has wider applicability than Waltz admits. Semantic issues also bedevil Waltz's explication; the unclear distinction between "system" and "structural" theory, for example, or the provocative use of the term "reductionist" to describe unit-level theories, have unnecessarily confused and alienated readers. The authors (hereafter BJL) aim to attenuate such difficulties and incorporate more factors into the definition of "structure." The resultant paradigm, Structural Realism, will differ from both classic Realism and Waltz's Neorealism.

Chapter 3: "System, Structure, and Units"

In international relations, a *system* exists amongst units whose actions influence each other. Two systems are commonly studied in IR: interstate systems, which consider only the behaviour of states and which Waltz concentrated on, and interhuman systems, which also include non-state actors. These systems are partitioned into nonexclusive *sectors*, such as the international societal or economic system, which emphasize different aspects of the whole. One can – but need not – restrict one's attention to a given sector, as Waltz did in considering only international politics. Perpendicular to these various sectors are the *levels of analysis*. These are mutually exclusive: at any given time, one can conduct a systems-level study of IR only at one level of analysis. Most commonly chosen in IR are the structural level or the unit (i.e., state) level.

Structural-level analysis must define its system, and do so in a way that is coherent from the perspective of the system as a whole or from its component sectors. Waltz's structure fails to do this, as governing is only intermittently the key principle it claims to be. It is therefore not entirely a Ruggiean *deep structure* – basic and self-generating: the question of "distribution of power" sits awkwardly atop Waltz's typology of deep political structures (as either hierarchic or anarchic and composed of either like or differing units). Further, in the implied 2×2 matrix of deep political structures, two of the cells are empty; anarchy begets (similarly) sovereign units just as microeconomic competition forces convergence in markets, and sovereign units chafe at the subjugation of hierarchy and thus force anarchy. Thus hierarchy is incompatible with similarity of units, and anarchy is incompatible with dissimilarity. This winnowing of potential structures stems entirely from Waltz's preoccupation with interstate systems and unnecessarily excludes a large portion of political reality. There are many dissimilar (but non-state, and thus non-sovereign) units operating in the present-day anarchic world. And is Waltz's precipitate assertion that sovereignty implies similarity ("Sovereign states are all alike, but each non-sovereign entity is non-sovereign in its own way") really justified? Are dominions the same as states? What of the EC?

An account of system theory must define units as well as structure, but in *Theory of International Politics*, the unit level – employed as a catch-all for the various issues with which Waltz does not care to sully himself – remains inchoate. But Waltz distinguishes usefully between actions deriving from unit attributes (e.g., foreign policy; such unit-based unit explanations are termed *attribute analysis*) and those stemming from unit interactions (e.g., processes, such as alliances or arms races, that can exhibit quasi-systemic features and thereby become *process formations*). Structural Realism accepts that the unit and structure levels are, as seen above, linked in the guises of (structural) "anarchy" and (unit) "autonomy."

The most consequential crack in Waltz's analysis is the dissociation between unit-level analysis and deep structure. A connection is made only tenuously, through the aggregation of various states' capabilities into a systemically-construed "distribution of power." Aggregation is problematic. While Waltz establishes a case for a distributive element – and being a relative concept distribution is inherently systemic – to the structure, why there can be only one, and why it must be the abstract "power," remains unclear. Such a wide-ranging amalgamation offers few benefits (the primary one being a misguided quest for parsimony and grand theory) but a high cost in explanatory power. BJL prefer a quatripartite vector of distributional forces, comprising political stability, economic strength, military might, and ideology. Even if there were an admissible method of aggregating capabilities, though, and however useful it may be in practice, the concept of a distribution of power has no logical relationship to the components of the deep structure. (The authors therefore term the configuration of power "distributional structure," important but distinct from deep structure.)

Chapter 4: "Beyond Neorealism: Interaction Capacity"

System theories must incorporate a place for interactions among the units. Waltz shunts such interactions to the unit level and declares them consequently peripheral, but such a preemptive dismissal diminishes the explanatory power of his theory. Structural Realism's foremost contrast with Neorealism, therefore, lies in its renewed emphasis on the rôle of interactions.

This is illustrated by the distinctions among *attributive* (i.e., absolute and positive-sum) and *relational* (relative and therefore zero-sum) power. Relational power is vital to Waltzian theory at both the structural and unit levels, while attributive power is of acknowledged import but relegated to the unit level. The attributive power of the Great Powers increased with the advent of nuclear weaponry, but the relational power did not; the world would have been bipolar after WWII, big boom bombs or no. (The traditional measure of relational power – who won the war between the powers? – is termed *control power*, but is circular and cannot be used.) BJL argue that subsuming attributive power into the great void of the unit level understates its importance. The *systemic capability* advanced through technology, or indeed norms, often transforms interstate interaction: consider communication and transportation technologies or institutions such as the UN and EC. Such developments vastly increase the *interaction capacity* of the system.

Interaction capacity stands as a third level of analysis, on par with units and structure; it entirely alters Neorealism's logic. Neorealism cannot explain the beginnings of an international system. It presupposes that a system exists – a system with sustained, relatively sophisticated interactions spanning the globe – and why or how this communication arose is beside the point. This model does not describe the mediæval world, let alone ancient times, where only the feeblest of connections linked civilizations. Without stronger, strategic connections, the fierce competitive logic forcing uniform sovereignty among states did not operate, and thus a deep structure of dissimilar units under anarchy emerged; but such a deep structure should under Neorealist logic be unsustainable. Yet Waltz clearly believed there was an enduring system in ancient times, else he would not have invoked Thucydides, the *Beowulf* of IR. The solution to this dilemma lies in interaction capacity: beneath the weak world system were subsystems of governments (e.g., Peloponnesian Greece) within which the Neorealist tenets took effect. Structural Realism also explains the development of the modern state system. As technology advanced, interaction capacity increased and the size of the subsystems grew until they merged into one large world system.

The Structural Realist paradigm, then, subsumes many of Waltz's critics. Aggregating all determinants of interaction capacities produces a rendition of Ruggie's "dynamic density." More disaggregated versions correspond to both neo-functionalist critiques and the interdependence beloved of Keohane (and Nye). It allows for more change in the system than Neorealism ever did, and – though interaction capacity is difficult to measure – it is easy to conceptualise and no more difficult to apply practically than is distribution-of-power logic.